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This paper contests the view that, before the U.S. tariff increases of 2018 and 2019, governments around 
the world successfully resisted protectionist pressures since the onset of the global financial crisis. 
Before President Trump was inaugurated, the cumulative build-up of over 11,000 policy interventions 
that discriminated against foreign commercial interests implicated over two-thirds of world goods trade. 
An exploratory data analysis of possible drivers of national policy mixes towards domestic and foreign 
commercial interests is presented. Clear differences between G20 and other nations and between the 
immediate crisis response (from November 2008 to December 2010) and afterwards are found. 
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The implementation of President Trump’s America First trade policy, which has so far seen import 
tariffs imposed on approximately $300 billion of trade, is regarded by many analysts as a defining 
moment for the multilateral trading system. Some contrast brazen U.S. unilateralism with policy choice 
in the years before, often crediting world trade rules with reining in protectionism. Paul Krugman, for 
example, has argued: 
“The world trading system is actually a quite remarkable construction—a framework that has 
consistently produced a high level of global cooperation. It has been pretty robust in the face of 
severe shocks—notably, the world did not see a resurgence of protectionism after the 2008 financial 
crisis” (Krugman 2018). 
But is this true? Did governments refrain from discriminating against foreign commercial interests 
during and after the worst global economic crisis in three-quarters of a century? For those who only 
associate protectionism with tariff increases, the answer is clear: there was no resurgence in 
protectionism. But as every economics student who has taken an international trade class knows, tariffs 
are not the only policy instrument available to governments to discriminate against foreign commercial 
interests. 
Much is at stake. There is the reputation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to think of. Coming 
on top of the failure to conclude the Doha Development Agenda and the near breakdown in the Appellate 
Body, a finding that WTO rules did not prevent widespread discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests during the crisis-era would cast a further cloud over the state of global cooperation on trade 
policy. An alternative perspective is that it may have been too much to expect an incomplete trade rule-
book to rein in the behaviour of desperate governments. 
A finding that there has been widespread resort to trade discrimination might also call into question 
our understanding of both unilateral trade policy choice (in particular the literature relating business 
cycles to protectionism1) and the theory of the WTO. Over the past 20 years the thrust of the latter has 
been to explain why cooperation between governments happens under the auspices of the WTO 
(Bagwell, Bown and Staiger 2016). Where does that theory stand if the predominant feature of the past 
10 years has been unilateral, extensive resort to trade discrimination? Or, put differently, if the past 
decade has witnessed substantial resort to trade distortions then how can this be reconciled with a body 
of theoretical work whose central finding is that governments forgo short-term advantage? 
The evidential point of departure in this paper from other assessments of the crisis-era protectionism 
that focus on tariff changes and trade defence actions (Bown 2011, Kee, Neagu, and Nicita, 2013) is to 
employ a dataset that contains not only these policy instruments but other trade distortions. Those other 
trade distortions relate not only to measures that restrict imports but also to policies that stimulate 
exports. Once consideration is given to the gamut of public policies that can discriminate against foreign 
commercial interests, then the scale of commerce affected changes markedly from the low percentage 
points of trade affected that are reported, for example, in the WTO’s monitoring reports on 
protectionism.  
So as to be clear, no claim is made in this paper to have discovered non-tariff measures or that this 
paper is the first to study them. Baldwin (1970) serves as an important reminder that alert trade analysts 
have long been aware of the potential significance of policies other than tariffs and trade defence. 
                                                     
* Thanks to Patrick Buess and Piotr Lukaszuk for their support in preparing the figures for this paper. All errors are mine. 
Comments are welcome and should be sent to simon.evenett@unisg.ch. The project to which this paper contributes has 
received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 
770680. 
1 Rose (2013).  
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Moreover Bhagwati (1988), among others, showed that resort to voluntary export restraints was the 
preferred discriminatory response following the sharp downturn of the early 1980s, not tariffs. 
Furthermore, agricultural trade economists have long been interested in the impact of state-provided 
export incentives, the importance of which in the contemporary era will soon become apparent. 
Despite receiving a mandate from governments to document, measure, and assess non-tariff 
measures in 1969, the United Nations has not been able to deliver reliable data on these state acts. Now 
that a database is available that contains lots of information of tariffs and non-tariff measures, one goal 
of this paper is to examine the amount of trade covered by different policy interventions that discriminate 
against foreign commercial interests. It is therefore possible to see whether focusing solely on tariffs 
and trade defence actions provides a misleading assessment of the scale of trade discrimination 
witnessed since the start of the global financial crisis. 
Complicating the assessment of the impact of the WTO on government resort to trade discrimination 
is the fact that from November 2008 to December 2018 the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) 
governments foreswore resort to certain trade policy instruments. The G20 pledge to eschew 
protectionism was not a binding, enforceable obligation, unlike WTO commitments. For some, then, the 
G20 pledge was cheap talk. However, for others—in particular, numerous political science, international 
relations, and international legal scholars—such “soft law” can alter behaviour. This begs the question 
whether the pattern of discriminatory policy choice by the G20 nations differed from those of other 
nations? 
An exploratory empirical analysis of the determinants of G20 and non-G20 nations’ resort to trade 
discrimination is conducted here. This analysis is far from definitive but given the lack of research on 
the drivers of trade discrimination it is a start that other analysts may wish to build upon. Since 
Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) demonstrated the importance of substitutability between tariff increases 
and devaluations of the national currency in the 1930s, consideration is given here to the possibility of 
substitution or complementarity between exchange rate changes as well as fiscal stimulus packages and 
the resort to trade discrimination. 
An implication of the “embedded liberalism” perspective advanced by Ruggie (1982) is that 
international trade norms—such as non-discrimination—can be suspended by governments if social or 
economic order is threatened by a crisis. To examine this matter here, the extent to which the resort to 
trade discrimination correlates with the change in unemployment at the beginning of the global financial 
crisis is examined. 
The possibility that WTO obligations might have affected the form rather than the quantum of trade 
discrimination is also examined here. Specifically, evidence is presented on whether the extent of pre-
crisis tariff binding overhang is correlated with measures of national trade policy stance once the global 
financial crisis hit. Taken together, the results of this exploratory empirical analysis shed light on 
whether G20 government behaviour differs from other nations and where it does not. 
The emphasis throughout this paper is on policy choice before President Trump was inaugurated. 
Given his election was largely unanticipated, in particular before the second half of 2016, then the policy 
choices of other governments are unlikely to have been influenced by the expectation of his election and 
the America First trade policies that might follow. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the data sources employed 
in this paper. Section three presents evidence on the share of goods trade affected by crisis-era 
discrimination since November 2008. The scale of pre-Trump trade discrimination worldwide is 
compared to the amount of Chinese exports hit by U.S. tariff increases in 2018, hence putting the first 
year of the Sino-U.S. trade war in perspective. 
Section four presents two sets of comparisons between the trade-related policy choices of the G20 
members as compared to other nations. The findings of the exploratory data analysis described above is 
summarised in this section. Conclusions are presented in section five. 
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2. Data sources employed 
The database on commercial policy intervention used in this study is the Global Trade Alert (GTA). 
Established in June 2009, it seeks to document all public policy changes that alter the relative treatment 
of domestic versus foreign firms around the world.2 Country coverage, therefore, extends beyond the 
G20. Identifying changes in public policy implies that the GTA database is best thought of revealing the 
“delta” (the change) in public policy towards international business rather than the height or size of any 
trade distortion or liberalisation.  
The GTA does not confine itself to a pre-defined set of trade policy instruments or to those policy 
instruments covered by WTO agreements.34 Nor does the GTA confine itself to measures harming 
foreign commercial interests, liberalising policy interventions are recorded too. Moreover, governments 
may discriminate against foreign commercial interests in markets abroad, not just in their home markets. 
Therefore, where relevant, evidence of changes in public policy towards exporters was collected as well.  
Wherever possible, and this has been the case in over 93% of interventions documented, official 
sources are used to document a public policy intervention. As of this writing, the Global Trade Alert 
database includes information on 20,477 different public policy interventions, over 14,000 of whose 
implementation harmed foreign commercial interests.5 
The GTA database uses the United Nations (UN) MAST classification for non-tariff measures. 
Where possible non-tariff measures, including tariff-rate quotas, are assigned to their respective MAST 
“chapter” and reference will be made in the next section to different MAST chapters.6 Later a distinction 
will be made between the more transparent commercial policy interventions and less transparent state 
actions and the MAST classification will be used to give a precise definition of the former. 
Each entry in the GTA database contains information on the implementing jurisdiction, the dates a 
measure was announced, came into effect, or lapsed, the policy instrument used, the products7 or 
services8 affected, the sector affected, and a description of the measure. From this information, 
automated means are used to establish which trading partners are affected by the implementation of a 
measure.  
For example, if Switzerland raises the tariff on imported butter then fine-grained UN trade data (from 
the UN COMTRADE database) is used to identify which trading partners exported butter to Switzerland 
in the year before the measure came into force. So-called support tables for international trade in goods, 
foreign direct investment, migration and where possible services trade have been assembled so that the 
identification of affected trading partners is subject to the least human intervention possible (thereby 
reducing the potential for human error.) 
                                                     
2 For a longer account of the methods used by the GTA team to document public policy see section four of Evenett (2019).  
3 The pitfalls in confining data collection to a pre-defined set of trade policies are described in section three of Evenett (2019). 
The deeper question here is, given the many forms of cross-border commerce in existence in the 21st century, what 
definition of protectionism is fit for purpose? Having written this, the GTA does not include information on technical 
barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and regional trade agreements, each of which some analysts contend 
can be a source of discrimination against foreign commercial interests. There exist other databases that document 
developments in each of the latter three areas of policy.  
4 Notice also that the relative treatment test is not a test of WTO legality. 
5 Statistics on global totals for policy interventions harming and benefiting foreign commercial interests can be obtained 
from https://www.globaltradealert.org/global_dynamics.  
6 For a list of the 16 MAST chapters of non-tariff measures as well as other information about this UN initiative see 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab20122_en.pdf?user=46.  
7 Products are classified using the six-digit level of disaggregation of the UN Harmonised System. This is the most 
disaggregated product classification for which international trade data is available worldwide.  
8 Services are assigned the relevant three-digit level of disaggregation of the UN CPC sectoral classification.  
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To avoid including public policy interventions that are likely to have trivial effects on international 
commerce, the GTA team uses de minimis thresholds. For example, trading partners where less than $1 
million of trade is affected by a foreign state act are not included in reports of policy interventions 
contained in the GTA database. Moreover, state aid involving less than $10 million of state largesse or 
less than $10 million of commerce are excluded as well. 
For each public policy intervention affecting goods trade in the GTA database, which includes 
information on the implementing jurisdiction, the product codes affected, and the affected trading 
partners, it is possible to calculate the total value of international trade that is “covered” or potentially 
affected by the implementation of that intervention. Given that the implementation of an intervention in 
a given year could affect the amount of trade in that year, then estimates of the potential trade affected 
must come from prior years.  
So as to avoid crisis-era intervention affecting any of the trade affected calculations, the GTA team 
uses the global trade flows available at the six-digit level of the UN Harmonised System for 2005-2007, 
three years before the crisis began, to define the shares of world goods trade affected by each 
intervention. Data on the total value of global trade in the year before an intervention is implemented as 
well as the calculated share of world trade mentioned in the last sentence are then used to estimate the 
total amount of trade affected by the implementation of that intervention.9 
The use of the GTA database in research, business analyses, media articles, and by governments is 
growing. As of this writing, there are 1,690 entries in the Google Scholar database that mention the GTA 
and its findings. The GTA database is frequently downloaded from its website.10 In 2016, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted “The Global Trade Alert database has the most 
comprehensive coverage of all types of trade-discriminatory and trade-liberalizing measures, although 
it begins only in 2008” (IMF 2016). An independent comparison of available datasets on crisis-era trade 
policy found that the GTA had the largest country coverage of non-tariff measures (Rau and Vogt 2017). 
In the exploratory data analysis conducted here three macroeconomic indicators are used. The data 
source for each is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The first seeks to capture the scale 
of the fiscal stimulus that a government undertook and is measured by the logarithm of the ratio of final 
government consumption spending on goods and services at the end of a given period to that at the 
beginning of the time period in question.  
The second indicator relates to exchange rate depreciation. Here the specific measure used is the 
percentage depreciation in the value of a national currency against the United States Dollar during the 
period in question. The third indicator relates to the dislocation in a national labour market at the start 
of the global financial crisis. This is measured as the increase in percentage points of the unemployment 
rate from 2007 to 2009.  
As part of the exploratory data analysis it was necessary to construct a measure of how constrained 
a WTO member’s tariff policies were by its respective tariff bindings just before the global financial 
crisis began. Using the WTO publication Tariff Profiles 2008 it was possible to calculate the difference 
between the mean bound tariff rate and the mean applied tariff rate for all goods for 2007 (or for the 
latest year available.) For the 123 jurisdictions for which this data was available, 96 of them had a tariff 
binding overhang of more than seven percentage points.  
The seven percentage point threshold is important for it equals the size of the tariff increase 
undertaken by the United States when it implemented the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930. Therefore, 78% 
of the WTO members for which data is available could have raised their tariffs by the same amount as 
Smoot-Hawley and not broken their WTO obligations at the beginning of the global financial crisis of 
                                                     
9 The GTA team has experimented with other ways to address the endogenity problem. For more information kindly write 
to the author. 
10 The data is available at https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction.  
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2008. Several large emerging markets (but not China) could have done so. Such evidence already casts 
doubt on the degree to which WTO obligations actually limited resort to trade discrimination at the start 
of the global financial crisis. Indeed, it would be better to argue that these 96 governments did not raise 
their tariffs significantly at the beginning of the crisis because they chose to, not because they were 
prevented from doing so by their WTO commitments. 
Having described the data employed, the discussion now turns to an assessment of the amount of 
global trade affected by the build-up of discrimination against foreign suppliers of goods since 
November 2008, the month that the G20 Leaders declared for the first time that they would eschew 
protectionism.  
3. The build-up of crisis-era trade discrimination worldwide. 
The purpose of this section is to summarise the principal implications of the GTA’s data collection for 
the scale of global goods trade that face policy-induced discrimination. Although the focus of this paper 
is on developments before President Trump was inaugurated, data on the years 2017-19 is also presented 
for completeness sake. 
In estimating the scale of world goods trade facing discrimination imposed by foreign governments 
it is important to take into account of 
(a) the fact that a discriminatory measure may lapse or be removed,  
(b) the fact that a measure may be implemented during a year and therefore some adjustment for 
duration in force is required,  
(c) that a particular trade flow may face multiple policy-induced trade distortions when competing 
at home or abroad, and  
(d) that state-provided export incentives by other governments may create trade distortions for a 
nation’s exports to third markets.  
Each of these features have been accounted for in the estimates that follow. 
Figure 1 presents for each of the years 2009 to 201911 estimates of the shares of world goods trade 
affected by every trade distortion in force in a given year (see the line “All included MAST chapters”12). 
Given that the GTA started collecting data in November 2008, then it is worth recalling that the shares 
presented would have been zero at the start. The reported shares therefore reveal how much of global 
goods trade were affected by the trade discrimination introduced since the beginning of the global 
financial year and that remained in force during each subsequent year. By 2016, before President Trump 
was inaugurated, more than two-thirds of global goods trade faced one or more trade distortions that 
were in effect that year. 
The build-up over time in the shares of global goods trade affected by trade discrimination is shown 
clearly in Figure 1. There was a huge jump at the start of the crisis era. During 2009 39% of world goods 
trade competed against trade discrimination that had been implemented in the previous 14 months (that 
is, since 1 November 2008). By 2010 that percentage had jumped to 57% from which it rose more slowly 
to 69% in 2013. A plateau of sorts emerges during 2013-16. After 2016, the share of world goods trade 
affected rose further, reaching 74% in June 2019.  
Figure 1 also breaks down the total share of world goods trade affected by trade discrimination into 
three categories of policy instrument: import tariff increases, subsidies to import-competing firms 
                                                     
11 The estimates for 2019 relate to the trade discrimination in effect in June 2019.  
12 Technically, import tariff increases do not have a place in the MAST classification but since they are a form of trade 
discrimination they are included in the calculation for “all” trade distortions.  
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(MAST chapter L), measures that affect exports including export incentives (MAST chapter P).13 There 
are several pertinent findings. 
First, in each year before and after President Trump was inaugurated, the share of world goods trade 
affected by measures to promote exports is larger than the shares affected by subsidies to local firms 
and by import tariff increases. From the global perspective, measures to expand exports and grab market 
share from foreign rivals are on a greater scale than measures to restrict imports.  
Notice also that in 2009, when many policymakers were worried about governments turning inward 
and succumbing to the import restrictions of the 1930s, in fact over a third of world goods trade was 
affected by new export incentives. As policymakers pinched the protectionist balloon in one place air 
was displaced not eliminated.  
It is, therefore, particularly unfortunate that so many trade analysts, journalists, and policymakers 
link trade discrimination or protectionism to import restrictions and falling world trade. Every 
agricultural trade economist is aware of the effects of export subsidies on global food trade. During the 
crisis years that problem spread to manufactured goods trade, the WTO rules on export incentives for 
such goods notwithstanding. 
Second, the fact that the share of global goods trade affected by export incentives fell in 2014 and 
the share affected by subsidies to local firms fell in 2015 implies that there is nothing inherent in the 
construction of the GTA dataset that implies these shares must rise over time.  
Third, even though tariff increases have received a lot of attention in 2018 and 2019, in fact subsidies 
to import-competing firms still affect a larger share of world goods trade. Without in any way 
diminishing the potential resource misallocation and damage done by import tariff increases, taken 
together with the finding about export incentives, different types of subsidies dominate crisis-era trade 
discrimination. It may be that such subsidies are harder to detect—perhaps because they can easier for 
governments to hide—but that does not deny their potential economic significance. 
Fourth, underlying the statistics presented in Figure 1 are thousands of discriminatory policy 
interventions documented by the GTA team. This serves as an important reminder that the world trading 
system can become thoroughly distorted by the accumulation of trade distortions. High profile 
protectionist acts, such as the Smoot-Hawley Act, are not necessary for a world trading system to 
become riddled with distortions. 
Fifth, since Figure 1 does report data on the shares of goods trade affected since President Trump 
was inaugurated, it is worth noting that the share of world trade affected by import tariff increases more 
than doubled from January 2016 to June 2019. Over the same timeframe the share of world goods trade 
affected by export incentives and subsidies to local firms also rose significantly. There is no suggestion 
that the United States is responsible for all of these changes. 
Figure 1 can be thought of as revealing the share of world goods trade affected by the stock of trade 
distortions in force in each year. Another way of assessing the scale of world trade affected by 
government resort to trade discrimination is to compare the amounts of trade implicated by new trade 
distortions that are implemented each year. Figure 2 presents data on the latter. 
Given the interest in the Sino-U.S. bilateral tariff war, rather than report actual amounts of trade 
affected, each piece of data is benchmarked against the total value of Sino-U.S. trade affected by tariff 
increases in 2018, indexing the latter at 100. Figure 2 presents data for each of the years 2009 to 2018 
                                                     
13 There are other forms of trade discrimination, such a government procurement measures to buy local products, that do not 
fit into these three categories. The purpose here is to show how much goods trade is affected by each of these three 
significant types of trade discrimination. Note also that any trade flow could be affected by more than one of these three 
types of trade discrimination, so there is no reason to expect the sum of the trade affected in any year across these three 
classes of policy to equal or be less than the total for the “all” category.  
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on the indexed value of trade affected by (a) U.S. tariff increases that target only China and visa versa, 
(b) all tariff hikes that harm only one nation’s exports, (c) all import distortions implemented in a given 
year and (d) all export incentives implemented in a given year. Note also that the vertical axis of Figure 
2 uses a logarithmic scale. 
The line at the bottom of Figure 2 confirms that Sino-U.S. targeting of each other’s exports was 
unusually high in 2018, indeed at least 10 times higher than any year from 2009 to 2017. Targeting with 
tariff increases of any one nation’s exports, which includes of course U.S. targeting of Chinese exports 
and visa versa, spiked in 2014. This reflects the EU’s withdrawal of trade preferences from Chinese 
goods, which came into force that year.14 Not all tariff increases have the public profile of those imposed 
by the Trump Administration. 
A key finding in Figure 2 is the extent to which the trade affected by new import distortions of any 
kind is, in every year, multiples of the tariff increases associated with the Sino-U.S. tariff war in 2018. 
In fact, in 2018 the ratio of trade affected by new import distortions that year to trade affected by the 
tariff hikes between the U.S. and China was over eight, implying that plenty of other import restrictions 
were being imposed while attention focused on developments in Beijing and Washington, DC. Another 
implication is that most policy interventions that restrict or limit imports do not target a single trading 
partner.  
Another striking finding of Figure 3 is that in every year the implementation of new export incentives 
has implicated more trade than that associated with new import distortions. The findings imply that in 
2009 nearly 20 times as much trade was affected by new export incentives implemented that year than 
by the trade at risk from the Sino-U.S. bilateral tariff war of 2018. 
At least as far as the amount of trade affected is concerned, the findings in Figure 2 call into question 
claims that U.S. tariff hikes of 2018 and Chinese retaliation were a defining moment in the development 
of the world trading system.15 In every year before the Sino-U.S. trade war the amount of trade affected 
by import distortions and by export incentives was far greater. The prominence of an act of trade 
discrimination can be misleading indicator of its global significance. 
In sum, well before the Trump Administration came into office there was sustained resort by 
governments around the world to trade discrimination. By 2016 over two-thirds of world goods trade 
was affected by trade discrimination that was in effect that year. Given that the GTA reporting started 
in November 2008 and allowing for the fact that some discrimination may not have been documented, 
then the actual share of world goods trade affected is larger. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4 of Evenett 
(2019), larger and larger proportions of world goods trade faced multiple policy-induced trade 
distortions. This is the consequence of the more than 11,000 instances of trade discrimination 
implemented worldwide between November 2008 and December 2016.  
The absence of comparable information on the resort to trade discrimination before November 2008 
might lead some to argue that it is unclear that the global financial crisis induced increased resort to 
trade discrimination. If this “business as usual” argument is correct then it implies that there was 
sustained resort to trade discrimination implicating significant scales of global commerce before the 
global financial crisis. In which case, it would be hard to argue that world trade rules reined in trade 
discrimination in that era as well.  
Of course, it would be preferable to nail down the argument with data on commercial policy choice 
from before November 2008. Even without such data, logic dictates that one cannot simultaneously 
                                                     
14 For more details see https://voxeu.org/article/raising-tariffs-china-without-grabbing-headlines.  
15 There may well be other grounds for arguing that the Sino-U.S. trade war was a defining moment. Evenett and Fritz (2018) 
argue that the brazen nature of the U.S. actions against China contrasts sharply with the creeping, hidden, or murky 
protectionism witnessed globally in prior years.  
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argue that the WTO was effective in deterring protectionism before the global financial crisis and that 
there was no fundamental change in resort to trade discrimination since the crisis began.  
4. Exploratory analysis of the drivers of national resort to trade discrimination. 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether certain factors account for the cross-national variation 
in the relative treatment of domestic versus foreign commercial interests. Particular attention is given to 
the share of nation’s entries in the GTA database whose implementation harmed foreign commercial 
interests. Plus a distinction is often drawn between policy measures implemented during initial crisis 
response (November 2008 to December 2010) and afterwards (but before the Trump Administration 
took office, therefore, from January 2011 to December 2016). Having written that, data for the entire 
period November 2008 to December 2016 is occasionally presented in this section.  
Moreover, in this section a distinction is often drawn between resort to traditional, more transparent 
policy instruments and resort to subsidies. The former are taken to include import tariff increases, trade 
defence measures and safeguards (MAST chapter D), non-automatic licensing procedures (MAST 
chapter E1), import quotas (MAST chapter E2), export restraints including voluntary export restraints 
(MAST chapter E5), tariff-rate quotas (MAST chapter E6), and quantity controls not otherwise specified 
(MAST chapter E9). For the purposes of the analysis here subsidies are taken to include subsidies to 
firms competing in home markets (MAST chapter L), export subsidies (MAST chapter P7), and export 
credits (MAST chapter P8). Recall that there are other forms of trade discrimination that fall outside 
these two groups, therefore observing, for example, an increased share of measures that are transparent 
does not automatically imply that the share of subsidies implemented by the same jurisdiction must be 
lower. 
Recalling also the discussion in the Introduction concerning the factors potentially influencing the 
behaviour of G20 governments, then a distinction is often drawn here between the variation in policy 
stance between G20 members and other governments. Indeed, this provides a good starting point for the 
discussion in this section. First indicators of the resort to trade discrimination for the G20 are contrasted 
with those of the next 20 largest trading nations (identified using pre-crisis trade data for 2007). In Figure 
3 the proportion of harmful measures implemented by the G20 and the “next 20” is shown for all years 
and broken down into the initial crisis years and subsequent years.  
Compared to the next 20 largest trading nations, on average the policy mix of the G20 nations was 
skewed more towards discrimination than liberalisation and more towards the resort to subsidies, both 
for import-competing firms and exporters. Resort to traditional instruments of trade discrimination was 
similar. Breaking out the policy responses between the initial crisis response and subsequent years is 
revealing. At the start of the crisis the G20 nations resorted more to traditional forms of discrimination 
and to subsidies than the next 20 largest trading nations. After that, during 2011 to 2016, the G20 
resorted proportionally more to subsidies and less to transparent trade discrimination, such as tariff 
increases. Overall, G20 policy stance shifted away from more transparent trade discrimination as the 
crisis era lengthened. 
Attention now turns towards other stylised facts concerning the crisis-era commercial policy 
response of the G20 members as compared to other nations. In what follows, rather than compute 
averages across the G20 members, each G20 member is treated as a separate observation and so are all 
of the other customs territories (referred to below collectively as non-G20), not just the 20 next largest 
traders.  
The first hypothesis considered is whether governments that resort more to harmful measures also 
resort to more traditional forms of trade discrimination. For both the G20 and non-G20 countries during 
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the entire period November 2008 to December 201616 there is a strong negative and statistically 
significant relationship17 between resort to harmful measures and resort to transparent forms of trade 
discrimination, such as import tariffs (see Figure 4). The negative relationship is stronger for the G20 
countries than for the non-G20 countries. This finding is consistent with the claim that governments 
under more pressure to favour domestic commercial interests resort to less transparent measures for 
doing so. 
The second hypothesis is that governments that resort more to harmful measures also resort more to 
subsidies. This hypothesis is not rejected by the data for the G20 members and the non-G20 members 
for the entire period and for the two sub-periods. A positive correlation is found for the G20 and non-
G20 countries in Figure 5, suggesting that governments under more pressure to favour local firms did 
so through subsidies of different types.18 That this is a global phenomenon is significant in light of the 
criticism that singles out China’s system of subsidisation.  
The third hypothesis examined is whether greater resort to trade discrimination correlates with a 
higher proportion of imports being affected such discrimination. Figure 6 reveals no such correlation in 
the data for either the G20 nations or the non-G20 nations for the entire period (November 2008-
December 2016, see upper panel of Figure 6). However, for the initial crisis phase a positive correlation 
was found for the non-G20 nations, which might be related to the earlier finding that for these countries 
the resort to traditional forms of trade discrimination falls off slowly as the propensity to resort to trade 
discrimination increases. Whatever the reason, Figure 6 shows a clear difference in behaviour between 
the G20 and non-G20 nations, at least as far as the initial crisis response is concerned. 
The possibility that resort to trade discrimination might substitute for exchange rate depreciation was 
noted in the Introduction. Here the discussion is broadened to include fiscal policy stimulus, not least 
because many governments responded initially to the global financial crisis by increasing public 
expenditure on goods and services in a Keynesian manner. Later, of course, many governments 
embraced austerity programmes, with the opposite implications for government spending (or at least for 
the growth of government spending.) 
Figure 7 plots the resort to trade discrimination (as measured by the share of measures implemented 
that were harmful to foreign commercial interest) against the logarithm of the ratio of government 
spending on final consumption goods between the respective end year and start year. For both the G20 
and non-G20 there is a negative relationship between these two variables in the initial crisis response 
years, November 2008-December 2010, suggesting that fiscal stimulus acted as a substitute for tilting 
the commercial playing field in favour of national firms. However, the negative relationship is only 
statistically significant for the non-G20 nations. Moreover, the relationship breaks down for the later 
years (2011-2016). In sum, as far as fiscal policy is concerned, the substitutability hypothesis cannot be 
entirely rejected. Nor can it be argued that it is entirely endorsed.  
As far as the potential substitutability between exchange rate depreciation and resort to trade 
discrimination is concerned, if anything, as the upper panel of Figure 8 shows, these two policy 
interventions were complements for the non-G20 nations during their initial crisis responses. 
Interestingly, no such relationship carries over to the period 2011-2016. Among the G20 nations there 
is no strong relationship between these two policy choices during the initial crisis response (November 
2008-December 2011) or subsequently (2011-2016). Once again, G20 behaviour appears to diverge 
from non-G20 behaviour. 
                                                     
16 And for both sub-periods. 
17 For each plot from Figure 4 on an ordinary least-squares regression was performed on the relationship between the variables 
on the two axes for the G20 sample and separately for the non-G20 sample. The fitted lines are reproduced in each figure 
as are the p-values for the estimated coefficients. 
18 The correlation remains positive and the p-values low if the observations where no subsidies were observed are dropped.  
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To assess whether the initial dislocation in the labour market, as proxied by the increase in the rate 
of unemployment from 2007 to 2009, may have influenced the resort to trade discrimination, the 
relationship between these variables was plotted and analysed (see Figure 9). The Embedded Liberalism 
hypothesis of Ruggie suggests that accepted international norms, such as non-discrimination towards 
trading partners, may be suspended if a crisis threatens social stability. Countries differ in terms of the 
initial labour market impact of the global financial crisis and so it is of interest to see if any clear 
relationship appears in the data. 
The upper panel of Figure 9 shows that for the G20 members resort to trade discrimination was higher 
by governments whose economies had experienced higher initial increases in unemployment. However, 
this positive relationship is not statistically significant. Interestingly, for the initial crisis years there is a 
mild negative relationship between the initial unemployment increase and resort to trade discrimination 
for the non-G20 countries, which is at odds with Ruggie’s thesis. As the bottom panel of Figure 9 shows 
there is no apparent relationship between the initial increase in unemployment and the propensity to 
engage in trade discrimination from 2011-2016, suggesting that whatever initial shock there was to 
national labour markets did not have an enduring effect on commercial policy choice. 
The tightness of a country’s WTO obligations is the final conditioning factor considered here. Much 
is made of trade rules and their apparent power. Given the substantial differences in the tariff binding 
overhangs across WTO members before the global financial crisis hit, to what extent did governments 
with less room for manoeuvre chose different commercial policy mixes than others? In Figure 10 the 
propensity to resort to discrimination was plotted against the tariff binding overhang in 2007 for the 
initial crisis years (November 2008-December 2010) and subsequently (January 2011-December 2016). 
Reviewing both panels of Figure 10 for non-G20 countries there is no evident relationship between 
their commercial policy responses and the tightness of their tariff bindings in either period. This may be 
because other factors matter or that there may be better indicators of the strength of a nation’s WTO 
disciplines. In contrast, for the G20 members a negative relationship is found in both periods, implying 
that the smaller the tariff binding overhang the larger the resort to trade discrimination. However, it 
should be noted that that relationship is only statistically significant19 once the initial crisis era passed, 
that is, for the six years 2011-2016. It would appear that tighter tariff disciplines on G20 members are 
associated, if anything, with more harmful policy mixes towards foreign commercial interests. 
Similar correlations were performed for the resort to transparent forms of trade discrimination, see 
Figure 11. In both periods there is no apparent relationship between resort to transparent forms of trade 
discrimination and strictness of tariff bindings for the large group of non-G20 countries. However, for 
the G20 countries there is a statistically insignificant positive relationship, suggests a weak tendency for 
G20 members that have plenty of space to raise their tariffs to resort to more transparent forms of trade 
discrimination (of which, tariff increases are one option.) 
When it comes to the resort to subsidisation, however, there are stronger relationships between the 
tightness of tariff bindings and the propensity to intervene in this manner to harm foreign commercial 
interests, see Figure 12. Although in terms of statistical significance the relationship is stronger for the 
years 2011-16, in both periods those G20 members that had less room to increase their import tariffs 
resorted more to subsidisation of local firms and of exporters. Whatever one’s assessment of the effect 
of WTO disciplines on the quantum of G20 trade discrimination, this finding suggests that the latitude 
allowed governments in their pre-crisis tariff obligations at the WTO affected the form in which they 
discriminated against foreign commercial interests. Taking the findings of Figures 11 and 12 together, 
G20 governments appear to have substituted transparent trade restrictions for subsidies.  
Overall, this exploratory data analysis has revealed differences between G20 and non-G20 members 
in the resort to trade discrimination and in the form of that discrimination. Monetary and fiscal policy 
                                                     
19 And only at the 10% level. 
The pre-Trump Build-up of Trade Discrimination: Scale, Drivers and Effects 
European University Institute 11 
choices appear to have influenced the commercial policy decisions of the non-G20 members more than 
the G20 members. Whereas the tightness of pre-crisis tariff bindings appears to have had more influence 
on the propensity and form of trade discrimination of the G20 members than on the non-G20 members.  
5. Concluding remarks 
Given the attention that the Sino-U.S. trade war has received, it is no wonder that analysts begun to 
examine the causes and consequences of this high-profile disruption to what many regarded as a well-
functioning global trading system. Making use of a detailed dataset of public policy intervention 
collected over the past decade, evidence was presented here that shows that the world trade in goods 
was thoroughly distorted, principally by trade-distorting subsidies, well before the election of President 
Trump seemed at all likely.  
Since economic policy analyses require carefully-specified initial conditions against which to judge 
a policy shock, such as imposing tariffs on several hundred billion US dollars of Chinese imports, then 
taking account of how distorted trade was when the Trump Administration took office could have 
material implications for the estimates of that shock. Put differently, modelling the impact of the Sino-
U.S. tariff war on the assumption that world goods markets are trading freely, or moderately freely, may 
be highly misleading.  
Another important finding is that steps to stimulate national exports cover much more of world goods 
trade than steps to restrict imports. The trade policy response to the 1930s Great Depression involved 
significant resort to import restrictions and competitive devaluations. The trade policy response to the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis was dominated by measures to promote exports. Like generals, who are 
often accused of trying the re-fight the last war, many trade policy analysts appear to have looked for 
the 1930s policy response and, having found none, prematurely declared victory for the world trading 
system. For sure, the economics and political economy of export incentives and import restrictions are 
certainly different, but they are both trade distortions. 
That nearly three-quarters of world trade currently faces one or more trade distortions imposed since 
the crisis began calls into question the effectiveness of current international trade rules.20 Some may be 
tempted to argue that matters would have been worse in the absence of those trade rules. Surely, the 
riposte is that if distortions to three-quarters of world trade constitute victory, then what constitutes 
defeat? Still, as the exploratory data analysis revealed, international trade rules may well have affected 
the form—if not necessarily the quantum—of trade discrimination implemented by the G20 members.  
One of the more interesting findings in the exploratory analysis relate to the differences in the factors 
that correlate with the commercial policy choices of the G20 and non-G20 countries. These differences 
are worth exploring further. Was G20 policy choice different because these economies were larger, in 
absolute or relative terms? Or was there something about the dialogue among the G20 members that 
altered their resort to trade discrimination? If so, what mechanism was at work and how did it add value 
to the dialogue under WTO auspices?  
In sum, the travails of the world trading system pre-date the Trump Administration coming to office. 
Stating that does not deny or diminish the harm being done to international trade and investment flows 
by the implementation of America First commercial policies. Those policies should be condemned on a 
number of grounds, economic, political, and geo-strategic. The risk is that by concentrating attention on 
the high-profile tariff developments of the past two years, other commercially significant forms of trade 
discrimination have been overlooked by analysts and policymakers. The consequences are likely to be 
poorly framed analysis and inadequate policy prescription. 
                                                     
20 Even in the absence of export incentives, as of this writing some 40.9% of world goods trade faces other forms of trade 
discrimination. Containing protectionism to “just” two-fifths of global goods trade hardly seems a success either.  
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Figure 1: By 2016, more than two-thirds of global goods trade faced trade distortions 
implemented since the crisis began 
 
Figure 2: The trade affected by the Sino-U.S. bilateral tariff war pales when compared global 
totals for annual resort to new import distortions and new export incentives 
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Figure 3: Compared to the next 20 largest trading nations, the G20 resorted to more trade 
discrimination and to more subsidies throughout 
 
Figure 4: Governments that resorted more to trade discrimination resorted less to 
transparent trade restrictions, November 2008-December 2016 
 
The pre-Trump Build-up of Trade Discrimination: Scale, Drivers and Effects 
European University Institute 15 
Figure 5: Governments resorted more to subsidies when they resorted more to trade 
discrimination, November 2008-December 2016 
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Figure 6: Only in the initial crisis response did greater resort to trade distortions result in a 
higher share of imports being affected and then only for non-G20 nations 
November 2008-December 2016. 
 
November 2008-December 2010. 
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Figure 7: Non-G20 governments that expanded government spending more resorted less to trade 
discrimination but the relationship broke down after the initial crisis response 
November 2008-December 2010. 
 
January 2011-December 2016. 
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Figure 8: For non-G20 governments resort to trade discrimination appears to complement 
exchange rate depreciation, but only in the initial crisis response 
November 2008-December 2010. 
 
January 2011-December 2016. 
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Figure 9: Initial increases in unemployment may have affected resort to trade discrimination in 
the early years of the crisis only 
November 2008-December 2010. 
 
January 2011-December 2016. 
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Figure 10: G20 members with smaller tariff binding overhangs tended to resort more to trade 
discrimination but only after the initial crisis period was over 
November 2008-December 2010. 
 
January 2011-December 2016. 
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Figure 11: A weak positive correlation exists for the G20 members between the size of tariff 
binding overhang and resort to more transparent trade discrimination 
November 2008-December 2010. 
 
January 2011-December 2016. 
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Figure 12: G20 members with smaller tariff binding overhangs resorted more to subsidies, in 
particular after the initial crisis period was over 
November 2008-December 2010. 
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